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THE HISTORY, MEANS, AND EFFECTS OF STRUCTURAL SURVEILLANCE
Jeffrey L. Vagle*
ABSTRACT
The focus on the technology of surveillance, while important, has
had the unfortunate side effect of obscuring the study of
surveillance generally, and tends to minimize the exploration of
other, less technical means of surveillance that are both ubiquitous
and self-reinforcing—what I refer to as structural surveillance—
and their effects on marginalized and disenfranchised populations.
This Article proposes a theoretical framework for the study of
structural surveillance which will act as a foundation for follow-on
research in its effects on political participation.
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I do really take it for an indisputable truth, and a truth that is one of the corner stones of
political science—the more strictly we are watched, the better we behave.
Jeremy Bentham1
Activities which seem benevolent or helpful to wage earners, persons on relief, or those who
are disadvantaged in the struggle for existence may be regarded as ‘subversive’ by those
whose property interests might be burdened thereby. . . Some of our soundest constitutional
doctrines were once punished as subversive.
Justice Robert Jackson2

I.

Introduction and Framework
There is nothing particularly new about surveillance. It is a concept that

is as old as humanity itself. As our earliest societies discovered, without the
ability to make disobedience of social norms difficult or costly through some
means of social control, communities of any size would be impossible to
maintain.3 But how do we discern between surveillance necessary for healthy,
inclusive, and successful communities, and those means that exercise social
control to an extent that ultimately endangers community viability? There does
not appear to be a bright line that clearly separates these regimes.
To blandly refer to surveillance as the pursuit of societal stability through
the encouragement of adherence to social norms, however, does not give full
voice to history’s violent efforts to impose or resist these means of social

1

The manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham in the Library of the University College
London, Box cliib, 331.
2
Robert Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Journal of the American Judicature
Society (June 1940) 18.
3
See note 66, infra, and accompanying text.
2

control.4 Political, economic, religious, and other social institutions all rise and
fall through the assertion of social control within a localized universe of
competing and cooperating social units, and through these periods of instability
and struggle, social institutions emerge.5 These social units then sustain
themselves by minimizing instability through means selected for their
ordinariness and relative invisibility.6 Social units beyond the scale of smaller
groups, such as families or isolated autonomous communities, require powerful
central administrations and armies of personnel to raise revenue, ensure public
safety, provide for national security, and the multitude of other functions critical
to the life of the modern state.7 In the shift to modernity and the information

4

See James Beniger, The Control Revolution 1986; Anthony Giddens, The
Nation-State and Violence 1985; D. Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy,
Risk, and Digital Discrimination (2003); Cathy Lisa Schneider, Shantytown
Protest in Pinochet’s Chile (1995); Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter,
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain
Democracies (1986); Henner Hess, Like Zealots and Romans: Terrorism and
Empire in the 21st Century, 39 Crime, Law & Social Change 339, 340-41 (2003);
Lucas de Blois, The Third Century Crisis and the Greek Elite in the Roman
Empire, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 33, H. 3, 358 (1984).
5
See Max Weber, Economy and Society 31 1978; James B. Rule, Social Control
and Modern Social Structure, in Private Lives and Public Surveillance 19 (1973).
6
“Faced with the problem of securing compliance from a mobile, anonymous
public, any regime must do its best to develop techniques to replicate the
functions of gossip and face-to-face acquaintance in small-scale social settings.”
Rule, Social Control and Modern Social Structure 23.
7
“The administrative system of the capitalist state, and of modern states in
general, has to be interpreted in terms of the coordinated control over delimited
territorial arenas which it achieves….no pre-modern states were able even to
approach the level of administrative coordination developed in the nation-state.”
Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity 57 (1990). See also Weber,
Economy and Society 48.
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society, these institutions developed new regimes of surveillance and
information management using the technological advances that emerged in
rapid succession starting in the late 19th century.8
Too often, however, we rely solely on the use of these of advances in
technology to identify “good” surveillance from “bad” surveillance. An explosion
of innovation has led us to frame the surveillance debate in terms of intrusions
specific to a particular use of technology, from the early 20th century (“Can they
really listen in on my telephone conversations?”) to the late 20th century (“Can
they really read my email?”) and beyond (“Can they really build a permanent
database of my location data?”).9 But as new technologies inevitably become
established as integral parts of our daily lives, our comfort with—or grudging
acceptance of—advanced surveillance methods tends to stabilize, and the bulk of
the surveillance debate turns to the realm of the newly possible.

This expansion was not without its early critics. Weber himself described the
“order…now bound to the technical and economic conditions of machine
production which today determine the lives of all the individuals who are born
into this mechanism” as an “irresistible force” and an “iron cage.” Max Weber,
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 123 (1992).
8
As Beriger points out, “even the word revolution seems barely adequate to
describe the development, within the span of a single lifetime, of virtually all of
the basic communications technologies still in use a century later: photography
and telegraphy (1830s), rotary power printing (1840s), the typewriter (1860s),
trans-atlantic cable (1866), telephone (1876), motion pictures (1894), wireless
telegraphy (1895), magnetic tape recording (1899), radio (1906), and television
(1923).” Beriger, The Control Revolution at 7.
9
See Inga Kroener and Daniel Nyland, New Technologies, Security and
Surveillance, in Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies 141 (Ball,
Haggarty, and Lyon, eds.) (2012.
4

The exploration and analysis of potential surveillance abuses of new
technologies is, of course, an important discussion that needs to take place. But
when we put too much focus on the future, we tend to lose sight of the
important surveillance issues of the past and present, a phenomenon prevalent
in popular media.10 This problem manifests itself in two related ways. First, it
tends to mask surveillance means that, over time, fade into the background
noise of life to the point that they become essentially invisible to all but the
most careful observers. These means, which I collectively refer to in this Article
as structural surveillance, are technology agnostic, tend to remove the traditional
observer from the surveillance equation through an autonomic presence, and are
remarkable only in their ordinariness.11 Second, due in large part to their metainvisibility, these means often provide an excellent blunt instrument of social
control, and are therefore prone to abuse.12 This misuse, of course, can increase
the visibility of these means, so they are often reserved for use within

10

See, e.g., Edward Wyatt and Claire Cain Miller, Tech Giants Call for Limits on
Government Surveillance of Users, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/technology/tech-giants-issue-call-forlimits-on-government-surveillance-of-users.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Justin
Fenton, Baltimore Police Used Secret Technology to Track Cellphones in
Thousands of Cases, Baltimore Sun, Apr. 9, 2015,
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-cistingray-case-20150408-story.html#page=1; Reuters, U.S. Sets Up Intelligence
Surveillance Technology Review Body, Aug. 12, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/12/us-usa-security-reviewidUSBRE97B0UT20130812.
11
See Section II.B, infra.
12
See Section III, infra.
5

marginalized or otherwise disenfranchised segments of the population, who are
less empowered to resist them.13
One example of this phenomenon (which I will explore further elsewhere
in this Article) can be found in the history of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.14 The fundamental precept of this text—forbidding all types of
unreasonable searches and seizures—is deceptively simple in its ambiguity, yet
the amendment clearly forbids the use of general warrants.15 The promiscuous
government searches under the general warrant originated under early English
law, and were well established as structural surveillance by the time members of
Parliament began to protest their use in the 17th century.16 The source of the
MPs’ consternation arose out of the Crown’s use of the general warrant against
“gentlemen and dissenting Protestants” (two politically powerful
demographics), when their only appropriate use (according to the MPs) was on
“vagrants and Catholics.”17
The American colonists of the 17th and early 18th centuries did not
immediately inherit this distaste for the general warrant and other structural

13

See Section IV, infra.
Amendment IV, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
15
See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
757, 758 (1994).
16
See Cuddihy at 134-140.
17
See Cuddihy at 22-23.
14
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surveillance, mainly because the articulate elites of these regions were the
beneficiaries of these programs, through the collection of revenue and the
suppression of insurrectionists in the colonial North, to slave patrols of the
colonial South.18 It was not until England transformed in the eyes of elite
colonists from Mother Country to Foreign Presence that American political
leaders turned fully against the unreasonable searches and seizures of the
Crown.19 In fact, revolutionary America presented something of a paradox with
respect to structural surveillance. On the one hand, by the late 18th century, the
existing constitutions of a majority of the original thirteen colonies contained
some sort of provisions against unreasonable search and seizure, with
opposition to such searches fading in intensity as one traveled further south.20
On the other hand, the revolutionary governments saw fit to ignore these
prohibitions when this structural surveillance presented expedient means to
suppress dissent, control trade, crush slave rebellion, generated revenue, or
control undesirable populations.21 Resistance to general warrants as structural
surveillance was finally articulated when antifederalists, recognizing the negative

18

See Cuddihy at 371-75.
One of the earliest—and most forceful—arguments against British general
warrants and writs of assistance arose out of Paxton’s Case (1761), where
Massachusetts lawyer James Otis denounced the practice as “instruments of
slavery” and reflected an absolutism that “cost one King of England his head and
another his throne.” James Otis, Against Writs of Assistance, Address Before
the Superior Court, February Term (1771), reprinted in 3 The Massachusetts
Spy Or, Thomas’s Boston Journal, Apr. 1, 1773.
20
Cuddihy at 603-13.
21
Cuddihy at 613-34.
19
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implications of an overly powerful central government, resulted in the drafting
and ratification of a Bill of Rights.22
So what drives political or social tolerance—or intolerance—for structural
surveillance? It is not as if the means of structural surveillance always go
unchallenged. While researching the history of claims challenging U.S.
Government surveillance programs, I had begun work examining the near
insurmountable obstacle of Article III standing facing these claimants.23 In
nearly every one of these cases, courts held that plaintiffs had failed to show
injury sufficient to bring a claim in U.S. Federal Courts.24 For a plaintiff to
establish Article III standing, current jurisprudence requires the plaintiff to be
able to show injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent;
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”25
Under this doctrine, an injury is not sufficient if it is based on a “speculative
chain of possibilities,” a difficult evidentiary obstacle to overcome if you are

22

See Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution 506-11 (1929);
Catherine Drinker Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia 24-54 (1966).
23
See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013); Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Committee v. Gray, 480 F.2d
326 (2d Cir. 1973); New Alliance Party v. FBI, 858 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
24
See Laird, 408 U.S. at 13-14 (the Court holding that “[a]llegations of a
subjective ‘chill’ [due to knowledge of surveillance program] are not an adequate
substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific
future harm.”)
25
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. CT. 1138, 1147 (2013) (citations
omitted).
8

challenging the constitutionality of a secret program.26 Even a showing of a high
probability of injury is not enough to meet this requirement.27 The Supreme
Court has even pointed out that, even if a denial of standing would mean that
the constitutionality of a government program could never be foreseeably or
meaningfully challenged, that fact alone is not enough to find standing.28 A high
bar indeed.
My initial research thus began as an exploration of the question of injury
in surveillance cases, testing current jurisprudence against the claims of
surveillance plaintiffs.29 While reading these cases, it began to occur to me that
the vast majority of the challenges were to programs that were either highly
technological in nature or otherwise exotic or sui generis. But the concept of
surveillance is neither bound to a particular technology nor is it peculiar to a
time or place—surveillance is as common as humanity itself. And while
advances in technology can change the nature of surveillance, why does
scholarship and case law tend to focus almost exclusively on recent programs
that rely on sophisticated telecommunications networks and advanced
computing technologies? Perhaps we are focusing on the wrong subjects when
we ponder surveillance harms. Our attention is naturally drawn toward the new

26

Amnesty cite
Whitmore v. Arkansas
28
Valley Forge Christian College (“the assumption that if respondents have no
standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.”)
29
ACLU v. Clapper; Amnesty v. Clapper.
27
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and unique, often to the exclusion of the old and common. So what do we call
surveillance that no longer meets these criteria?
This research—beginning with this Article—is an attempt to closely
examine the means of surveillance that have been outpaced by technology, yet
still remain, if only as nearly-invisible background noise, and to quantify the
individual and societal harms that stem from these common methods and
programs. This surveillance, which I describe herein as structural surveillance,
includes those measures that have, through legislation, codification, or cultural
habit, have developed or calcified into systems that fit neatly within our
accepted societal institutions, and have become so commonplace to become
virtually indistinguishable from the backgrounds of our everyday lives.
My research can be divided into two components. First, through this
Article, I will lay out exactly what I mean by structural surveillance, describing
its history and means, and beginning an exploration of its effects. From there,
my research will turn toward an empirical study of these effects, the results of
which will be described in future Articles.

II.

The Concept and History of Structural Surveillance
A.

Structural Surveillance and Structural Violence

10

In his 1969 paper Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,30 Johan Galtung took
on the difficult task of articulating a useful definition of violence. As a basis,
Galtung started with the concept that “violence is present when human beings
are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are
below their potential realizations.”31 Violence, then, “is that which increases the
distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the
decrease of this distance.”32 Galtung’s definition operates within the context of
influence relations, where the definition assumes an influencer (the subject), an
influence (the object), and the mode of influence (the action).33 But how do we
reason about violence when there is no direct subject in the standard relational
triangle? Does it make sense to consider the case where someone is the object of
violent action that is not directly attributable to a specific actor? Galtung
reasoned that such a scenario must be accounted for, since there are clear
instances of this type of violence that manifest as unequal power and unequal
life opportunities.34
The term Galtung coined to describe this category is structural violence—
violence built into societal structure that is just as meaningful as any other
category of violence, yet becomes less visible due to its missing subject-action-

30

6 Journal of Peace Research 167 (1969).
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id at 169.
34
Id at 171. Galtung points to instances of institutional racism as examples of
this subjectless violence, citing Stokely Carmichael’s work on
31
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object relationship.35 Structural violence becomes associated with a certain
stability, and its deceptively “tranquil waters” attract less notice than the overt
action (and actors) of personal violence.36 Within a stable society, personal
violence—a stabbing, a shooting, a riot—stands out as an aberration, a deviation
from the static social order, whereas structural violence is the order.37 Structural
violence may indeed be understood and accepted by some as simply the price of
stability, even if the costs are borne unequally across social divisions.38
Giddens’s work provides a link between state violence (in the sense
Galtung was describing) and state surveillance under a general theory of the
sources of power.39 Giddens describes a society’s sources of power (and,
ultimately, violence) using a container metaphor, where power is generated and
stored through the concentration of resources, and is strongly influenced by the
technologies available to that society.40 This power creation and “containment”
is accomplished via surveillance in two senses. First, surveillance can enable the
collection and, more importantly, storage of “coded information” relevant to the
administration of the population in question.41 The introduction of digital
communication has, of course, vastly expanded the possibilities for the
collection of coded information, and has opened up new universes in the storage
35

Id. See also Slavoj Vivik, Violence.
Id at 173-74.
37
Id.
38
See Section XX, infra.
39
Anthony Giddens, Nation-State at 12-14.
40
Giddens at 13.
41
Id. at 14.
36
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and analysis of that information.42 Second, surveillance is employed in the
“classical” sense, where the activities of one group are directly supervised by
another.43 These methods can be useful within small societies without the aid of
any particular organizational structure, but can only be scaled to larger societies,
e.g., the modern nation-state, through the integration of advanced bureaucracies
and network infrastructure, factors which are also greatly enhanced through the
deployment of advanced technologies.44
The piece of Giddens’s work that is most relevant to this research is his
linking of surveillance to an organization’s control over the “timing and spacing”
of human activities.45 Surveillance—specifically, the coding of information
describing these activities—is critical to the state’s power/violence monopoly,
because it provides a framework for effectively scaling direct supervision to
nation-state sizes.46 This expansion of surveillance capabilities, as tightly
integrated into our modern concept of governance, is thus both the vector

42

A topical example of this can be found in the recent (and secretive)
construction of the NSA’s massive data center near Bluffdale, Utah. See James
Bamford, The NSA is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch What
You Say), Wired, Mar. 15, 2012. Details about the facility are, of course,
speculative, but experts have estimated the data storage capacities of the facility
to be anywhere from 12 exabytes to 5 zettabytes. Kashmir Hill, Blueprints Of
NSA's Ridiculously Expensive Data Center In Utah Suggest It Holds Less Info
Than Thought, Forbes, Jul. 24, 2013. For reference, 1 zettabyte = 1,000
exabytes = 1 billion petabytes = 1 trillion terabytes.
43
Giddens at 14.
44
See Eugene Litwak, Technological Innovation and Theoretical Functions of
Primary Groups and Bureaucratic Structures, 73 Am. J. of Sociology 468 (1968).
45
Giddens at 46-48.
46
Id.
13

through which the modern large-scale bureaucracy is made possible, as well as
the institutional means through which the state builds and contains power.47

B.

The Characteristics of Structural Surveillance

Based in part on Gultung’s theory of structural violence, and Giddens’s
links between power/violence and surveillance, I will consider the proposed
concept of structural surveillance. As discussed supra, links between the state,
violence, and surveillance are well established in the literature, and provide a
foundation upon which to build this conceptual framework. My goal with this
Article is twofold. First, I will develop a theoretical history and language
through which one can reason about the means and effects of social control
regimes that have become calcified within institutional structures to the point of
normalcy. Second, I intend to use this theoretical framework to develop
empirical explorations of these systems and their effects on the objects of
surveillance.
I define structural surveillance through two core characteristics—selfreinforcement and ubiquity. By self-reinforcing, I mean those surveillance systems
that have, through legislation, codification, or cultural habit, developed (or
calcified) into systems where there is no easily identifiable watcher, and which
seem to operate on their own, outside of normal means of control. By ubiquity, I
do not necessarily mean that the system is uniform across all communities or
populations, but instead refer to systems that have become commonplace to the
47

Id. at 47-49.
14

extent that those outside its gaze either endorse or ignore its existence, and
those under its gaze eventually accept it as woven into the fabric of reality.
Together, these two characteristics create surveillance systems that appear to
violate the usual subject-action-object power relationship, and fade into the
background of our daily lives.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the concept of structural surveillance is
through an example. The concept of city planning in America grew out of the
demands of rapidly increasing populations, and the associated sudden need for
transportation, commerce, public health, and public recreation facilities.48
Following an extended period of instability and unrest in American cities in the
mid-19th century, Frederick Law Olmsted, a landscape architect and journalist,
proposed the creation of parks and other public spaces within cities to act as
“social safety-valves,” where people from all socioeconomic classes could meet
not only to enjoy common recreational pursuits and escape the stresses of the
burgeoning city, but also to engage in civic society with minimal institutional
control.49 The idea of public spaces has long had a place in the urban setting, but
the concept experienced a rebirth in the Victorian city.50 Haussmann’s Paris
provides another example of this philosophy, where public urban innovations
such as the boulevard expanded access to all of a city’s inhabitants, and

48

Olmsted, The Town Planning Movement in America, 172-74.
See Mike Davis, City of Quartz (1990).
50
See Peter Goheen, Public Space and the Geography of the Modern City, 22
Progress in Human Geography 479 (1998).
49
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democratized the public sphere in ways that existing institutions had little
control over, a fact that made the governing class somewhat uncomfortable.51
The public sphere had turned from an exclusive space to an inclusive space, both
figuratively and literally.52
It was not long before concerns over public safety and public health began
to temper enthusiasm for public spaces.53 These concerns, both real and
imagined, found fertile ground in the 19th century theories regarding the
working classes and the poor generally.54 These “dangerous classes” were
described as a persistent threat to the established social order, and attempts to
alleviate poverty or ignorance were seen by social and economic philosophers as
wasted efforts, as it was well understood that the lower classes were victims of
their own defects, and accommodations such as increased access to public
spaces would only serve to “raise the worthless above the worthy.”55
It was, of course, true that controlling crime and otherwise maintaining
order in public spaces posed a nontrivial challenge for 19th century governments,
due in part to the fact that the concept of modern policing was only just

51

See David Harvey, The Political Economy of Public Space.
See Miles Ogborn, Ordering the City: Surveillance, Public Space and the reform of
urban policing in England, 1835-56, 12 Political Geography 505–521 (1993); Peter
G Goheen, Public space and the geography of the modern city, 22 Progress in Human
Geography 479–496 (1998).
53
See Henry Mayhew, London Labour and the London Poor: a cyclopaedia of the
condition and earnings of those that will work, those that cannot work, and
those that will not work (1851).
54
See Malthus quote in Lydia Morris, Dangerous Classes at 10-11.
55
Morris at 12.
52
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beginning to take shape.56 The notion that a professionalized administrative
body could be established not only to react to crimes already committed, but
could proactively enforce social control on the streets to ensure “the general
organization of city life” was something of a revolution.57 The introduction of
regular police patrols in 19th century cities, along with the creation of related
political and administrative mechanisms at all levels, reestablished social order
and initiated the concept of modern policing.58
This concept—a revolutionary and not uncontroversial innovation at the
time—has become a permanent part of the fabric of modern governance, and
with it, the Olmstedian concept of the minimally controlled public space has
become increasingly enmeshed in structural surveillance. City squares and
downtown streets now offer few, if any, spaces not visible to the gaze of closed
circuit television (CCTV) cameras.59 Fear of crime, or more recently, terrorist
activity, has driven an increased police presence which includes such recent
innovations as portable watchtowers, arrays of microphones to triangulate the
source of gunfire, electronic communications collection vans, and a general
militarization of tactics, weaponry, and other equipment, which has all become
56

Cite notes from Victorian policing folder
Ogborn 507
58
See Miles Ogborn, Ordering the City: Surveillance, Public Space and the reform of
urban policing in England, 1835-56, 12 Political Geography 505–521 (1993); S
Auerbach, “The Law Has No Feeling for Poor Folks Like Us!”: Everyday Responses to
Legal Compulsion in England's Working-Class Communities, 1871-1904, 45 Journal of
Social History 686–708 (2012).
59
Paul Lewis, You're being watched: there's one CCTV camera for every 32
people in UK, The Guardian, Mar. 2, 2011.
57
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surprisingly commonplace in the relatively short time since the tragic events of
September 11, 2001.60
Thus, in the space of about 150 years, the public space has experienced a
gradual introduction to surveillance means of widely differing levels of
technological sophistication, with a rather sudden increase in methods in the
years since 9/11. What we have witnessed in these changes is the establishment
of structural surveillance in a particular public sphere. When these means—from
the first establishment of regular police patrols to the installation of automated
CCTV cameras—were first introduced, they were often noteworthy, if not
controversial.61 But they were eventually accepted as unremarkable fixtures of
everyday life (ubiquity), and were established through legislative or regulatory
processes that effectively removed the easily identifiable watcher from the
surveillance equation (self-reinforcement).62 As I will explore later in this
Article, these means of structural surveillance, in our public spaces and

60

For a general discussion of this topic, see The New Politics of Surveillance and
Visibility, Haggerty and Ericson, eds. (2006); Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior
Cop (2013); Daryl Meeks, Police Militarization in Urban Areas: The Obscure
War Against the Underclass, 35 The Black Scholar 33 (2006); Samuel Nunn,
Police Technology in Cities: Changes and Challenges, 23 Technology in Society
11 (2001); Fassin, Enforcing Order: An Ethnography of Urban Policing (2013).
61
See Leon Hempel and Eric Topfer, The Surveillance Consensus: Reviewing the
Politics of CCTV in Three European Countries, 6 European J. of Criminology
157 (2009).
62
See Section II.B, supra.
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elsewhere, often place a substantial burden on the “dangerous classes” while the
benefits tend to flow to the upper and governing classes.63

C.
Structural Surveillance as a Natural Result of the
Information Society
Of all the innovations that emerged from the industrial revolution, the
advent of modern bureaucracy may well be the most successful, both in terms of
longevity and scope.64 A defining characteristic of bureaucracy, and in turn, a
strong inclination of modernity, is surveillance.65 Surveillance itself is, of course,
nothing new, and it is important to separate the concept of surveillance from
any particular era or technological phenomenon.66 In fact, social control and the

63

See Section XX, infra.
See Max Weber, Economy and Society (1978) 969-73; James R. Beniger, The
Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information
Society (1986) 7 [hereinafter Control Revolution]; Edward Higgs, The Rise of
the Information State: The Development of Central State Surveillance of the
Citizen in England, 1500-2000, 14 Journal of Hist. Sociology 175 (2001).
65
See Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (1985); Ulrich Beck,
Risk Society and the Provident State, in Risk, Environment and Modernity:
Toward a New Ecology, Scott Lash et al., eds. (1998). Beck describes the need
for increased surveillance as a direct result of industrial society, when the
“social, political, ecological, and individual risks created by the momentum of
innovation increasingly elude the control and protective institutions of industrial
society.” Id. at 27. When these new or expanded risks outstrip the existing
capacities of analysis, policy, or regulation to understand or cope with the issue,
pressure is created to develop new methods of surveillance and control.
66
The need for any society to regulate itself according to a set of values and
principles is achieved through some form of social control. See Morris Janowitz,
Sociological Theory and Social Control, 81 Am. Journ. of Sociology 82 (1975).
Societies and civilizations have long used surveillance as a means of effecting
social control through relatively simple means, including tax collection, census,
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associated means of surveillance have advanced and adapted—often quite
radically—over the millennia, in response to cultural and technological
changes.67 Evolutions in social control become part of a feedback loop with the
very structures of the society from which they emerge, a phenomenon I will
return to in later sections of this Article.68 As communities became societies, as
artisans turned to enterprises, as religious groupings emerged and morphed, and
as markets emerged and expanded, values and principles evolved, and along
with them the means—voluntary and coercive—of enforcement.69
In the period from the mid-18th through mid-19th centuries, as
industrialization in western nations began to create increasingly complex
systems of interdependencies between manufacturing, capital, energy
production, labor, and markets, new means of communication and control were
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required to take full advantage of new economies of scale and realize
productivity levels unheard of under earlier forms of management and
organization.70 Technological innovations in manufacturing and transportation
brought with them new paradigms in social and economic thought and behavior,
bringing an end to thousands of years of predominantly agricultural society, and
therefore displacing the traditional means of social control without providing an
immediately obvious replacement.71 The resulting dramatic increases in
transactional speeds inevitably outpaced the existing modes of social control and
interaction, and began to threaten the viability of incumbent institutions and
structures.72
I should note here what I mean when I use the term control within the
scope of this Article. Here, I refer to control in its most general sense—to
influence or direct behavior toward some predetermined goal. This definition is
informed by the sociology literature, which examines the social relationship, the
organization, voluntary or compulsory social participation, and consensual and
imposed order.73 Hence, control, in this sense, is primarily concerned with the
two elements of influence and purpose, and control theory—in both the
70
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sociological and mathematical senses—require facilities for the communication
and processing of information in order to manage behavior through feedback.74 I
will introduce refinements to this definition in later sections, but for the time
being, it will suffice to say that control here refers to any influence guided by
purpose, however small.
The 19th century crisis of control was not limited to industrial and
commercial spheres.75 Societal and governmental institutions were also
experiencing their own growing pains due also to the transformative effects of
industrialization.76 The levels of communication and information processing
necessary for control in preindustrial institutions could be generally be obtained
through in-person interactions, and without the need for advanced technologies
or extensive communications infrastructures.77 These methods did not work at
the scales driven by industrialization, and institutions at most levels were
seeking a means to restore the levels of control they once enjoyed.78
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Correlative to the search by industrial, commercial, and governmental
institutions for restored levels of control came the (re)emergence of the modern
bureaucracy.79 The increasing amounts of information deemed necessary to
efficiently operate the complex systems newly created by the modern state and
commercial enterprise required an overhaul and expansion of the age-old
concept of centralized administration, and the importance of bureaucracy as an
essential tool in dealing with the modern crisis of control is difficult to
overstate.80 Further, even with the benefit of an organized and centralized
bureaucracy, a society is ultimately hamstrung in its ability to build and contain
power by the limits of the technology available to that society.81 The limitations
on an organization’s ability to gather and analyze Giddens’s coded information is

industrialization, and therefore “the new system had to be generalised to all
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directly dependent upon its ability to communicate, store, and process that
information, a characteristic described by Weber’s concept of rationalization.82
The core idea behind rationalization is the proposition that a society’s
creation and containment of power through control can increase either through
increasing the society’s capability to process coded information, or by limiting
the amount of that information to be processed.83 The modern state has
modified this concept by maximizing both precepts: increasing information
processing capability in order to effectively decrease the amount of information
that is processed.84 The resulting organizations, processes, and technologies
must therefore become part of the state’s evolved infrastructure, much as
cooperative organ systems became integral to complex organisms. This
description should not convey any sort of malign intent on the part of the state
or its institutions—it is meant to be descriptive rather than normative, and
merely illustrates the functions necessary for an administrative body of scale to
operate and survive.85
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In fact, the state and similar social structures have emerged out of a
natural desire to protect and promote societal institutions and their members.86
The role of surveillance in these structures is to realize the goals of these
structures in practice, taking such early forms of censuses and revenue collection
in order to support social order through public safety, public health, and
providing for the general welfare of its citizens or members.87 The ambiguity
surrounding surveillance—especially structural surveillance—is in its dual
nature: it acts both as means for a state to enforce rights and privileges granted
to its citizens, while at the same time, providing the capabilities for states to use
that same infrastructure to curtail those rights.88 This ambiguity over
surveillance as a means of social control, and its effects as an integral part of our
governmental systems, is what this research will explore.

III.

The Means of Structural Surveillance
The explicit or implicit establishment of structural surveillance programs

can in almost every instance be traced to benign social control mechanisms
initiated for the benefit of (most of) the community. Challenges arising from
growing populations, technological advances, the spread of disease, and external
and internal threats to general order act as forcing functions on societies to
86
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establish means of meeting these challenges, or at least attenuating
unmanageable fluctuations. The modern state arose in large part as an organized
response to these challenges, building within itself the administrative and
political power necessary to both achieve legitimacy and establish and enforce
order within the community.89
The late- and post-modern periods are marked by significant
socioeconomic and political changes, beginning with western reconstruction
efforts following World War II.90 This seismic shifting brought with it a growing
sense of insecurity and fear of risk, a defining characteristic that Beck dubbed
the “risk society.”91 The pathology of this outlook can be found in its selffeeding concept of risk, in which the “social, political, ecological and individual
risks created by the momentum of innovation increasingly elude the control and
protective institutions of industrial society.”92 Thus, unstoppable progress has
its own “systematically produced hazards” that will forever be beyond the
current capabilities of protecting from these hazards.93 This outlook, along with
the modernist quest for scientific and industrial innovation, combined to form a
social control system that is forever chasing its own tail.
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The examples that follow are not meant to be an exhaustive list of all
forms of structural surveillance used today. Rather, I present a list of items to
best highlight the range of structural surveillance means addressing an array of
public concerns. An ongoing portion of this research will continue to catalog
surveillance programs and methods to better understand the effects of these
programs.94

A.

Public Safety

Among the earliest societal needs to be addressed by the revolutionary
strains of social and economic thought that emerged along side Western
industrialization in the 18th and 19th centuries was that of public safety.95 As
populations increasingly migrated to cities in search of work, the resources of
metropolitan areas immediately began to feel the strain of such rapid growth.96
Existing social control mechanisms were no longer effective at the scales
required by burgeoning cities, and there was a deep concern among the upper
classes with political disorder, criminality, and threats to the existing social
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order.97 These concerns were often conflated into a general fear and dislike of
the “dangerous classes” as the primary source of social disruption.98
Social reformers such as Bentham identified criminality and similar antisocial behaviors as symptoms—addressing these issues would not solve the
ultimate problem of regulating the growing instability of industrialized city
life.99 Rather, social order would only be restored by ensuring that the working
classes were encouraged to adhere closely to the preexisting social norms.100
This encouragement was described in terms such as “inspection,” “regulation,”
and the “general prevention” of undesired conduct.101 Short of calling in the
military, however, states did not have a secure monopoly on the means of
violence, which made policing this conduct messy and difficult.102
Robert Peel became England’s Home Secretary in 1822, and brought with
him experience in policing, having set up the Dublin “Peace Preservation Force”

97

Id.
See Joe Soss, Richard C Fording & Sanford F Schram, Disciplining the poor:
Neoliberal paternalism and the persistent power of race (2011).
99
Bentham, Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation.
100
See Lydia Morris, Dangerous classes : the underclass and social citizenship
(1994).
101
Id.
102
See id.; S Auerbach, “The Law Has No Feeling for Poor Folks Like Us!”: Everyday
Responses to Legal Compulsion in England's Working-Class Communities, 1871-1904, 45
Journal of Social History 686–708 (2012); Miles Ogborn, Ordering the city:
surveillance, public space and the reform of urban policing in England 1835–56, 12
Political Geography 505–521 (1993). Tadhg O' Ceallaigh, Peel and Police Reform in
Ireland, 1814-18, 6 Studia Hibernica 25–48 (1966).
98

28

in 1814.103 While there were various police units operating in London at the
time, these forces focused mainly on the protection of property, and did not
have the resources or organization to engage in the sort of preventive policing
Bentham and others had in mind.104 Peel argued that the primary goal of his
organized police force should be crime prevention and moral order, with a focus
on subduing the “dangerous classes,” and by consolidating the authority within
a centralized administrative body, could pursue this goal far more efficiently
than the existing models.105
Here, we see the beginnings of a system of structural surveillance at
work. By institutionalizing a public safety role that had largely been left to
private interests, ad-hoc local governments, or the Crown (via the military), a
consolidated and professionalized preventive police force replaced the
identifiable object (watcher) in the surveillance equation with the society (via
103
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government) itself (self-reinforcement). Further, a regulated police force
ensured a uniformity—in action, purpose, and aesthetic—that could not be
achieved under the existing systems, which aided public acceptance of the
system and ensured its integration into everyday life (ubiquity). And as we will
see, this system of modern policing, while allowing for effective scales not
possible under earlier regimes, encouraged wholesale increases in information
collection and management, which increased efficiency while at the same time,
enabled abuse.
To illustrate these concepts in contemporary terms, I will build upon the
public space example I outlined earlier in this Article.106 The Olmstedian
philosophy of public space as democratized geography, where open access to all
classes of society was not only allowed, but encouraged, was not without its
problems. Crime was certainly present, but there was a deeper concern (held
principally by the upper classes) regarding general social disorder.107 From this
general public safety concern arose four interrelated systems of structural
surveillance: broken windows policing, widespread CCTV use, suspicionless
stop and frisk policies, and algorithmic policing.
In 1982, Wilson and Kelling published their influential “Broken
Windows” article, which suggested that police could more efficiently address
crime by targeting social disorder and nuisance crimes directly, thereby breaking
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the cycle of localized community decline.108 The basis for this thinking can be
found in what has been called the incivilities thesis, which proposes that social
disorder in a community leads to an increased fear of crime in that community’s
residents, which in turn leads to a general civic withdrawal from the
community.109 The theory concludes that this withdrawal feeds into a cycle of
general community decline in the levels of social control, which leads to
increased localized crime and disorder.110
The broken windows policing concept took hold quickly among the police
departments of major American cities, and is arguably one of the most
important changes to policing in recent decades.111 Implementations of broken
windows policing have varied in tactics from department to department,
adopting different strategic approaches ranging in aggressiveness, the most
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visible example of which was adopted by the New York City Police
Department.112 The “New York style” of broken windows policing was initiated
in 1993 as the “quality of life” initiative, focusing on nuisance offenses that had
been ignored under earlier regimes, including turnstile jumping, panhandling,
and public drinking.113 Within a relatively short period of time after the
introduction of the new initiative, New York City’s overall crime rate began to
drop, an occurrence almost universally attributed to the “smarter policing” of
the broken windows theory.114
The perceived success of broken windows policing in New York City
initiated a wave of adoption of the practice in other major cities, including
Chicago, Los Angeles, Baltimore, and Boston, which soon began to attribute
their own success stories to the new approach.115 Proponents of the broken
windows policing method pointed to a key component of its success: the full
integration of widespread data collection, information technology, and statistical
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analysis to policing.116 This analytical approach was viewed as an ideal solution
to the crisis of control then affecting law enforcement, and was just the sort of
enhancement desired (or required) within an information society.117 The data
collection effort did not necessarily require any advanced technologies. Simply
saturating a particular neighborhood, subway stop, or park with police patrols
would generate a massive amount of actionable information, a benefit
highlighted by broken windows proponents:
Our experience is that most citizens like to talk to a police officer.
Such exchanges give them a sense of importance, provide them
with the basis for gossip, and allow them to explain to the
authorities what is worrying them…. You approach a person on
foot more easily, and talk to him more readily, than you do a
person in a car. Moreover, you can more easily retain some
anonymity if you draw an officer aside for a private chat. Suppose
you want to pass on a tip about who is stealing handbags, or who
offered to sell you a stolen TV. In the inner city, the culprit, in all
likelihood, lives nearby. To walk up to a marked patrol car and lean
in the window is to convey a visible signal that you are a “fink.”118
A (possibly unexpected) enhancement of the information collection
process came directly from the aggressive pursuit of nuisance crimes. Police
departments soon discovered that their overall surveillance efforts would benefit
from the creation of informants through misdemeanor arrests.119 Not only were
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those arrested possible sources of information on others, their biometric data
(fingerprints, DNA) could be collected for indefinite storage and analysis in
other investigations.120 These methods were seen as so successful and necessary
that they quickly became the driver of broken windows policies rather than a
mere by-product.121
Coinciding with the rise of broken windows policing policies came the
technological innovation of closed circuit television (CCTV) deployment.122
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Rapid improvements in digital camera and information processing technologies
made widespread CCTV deployment attractive as a low-cost means of
augmenting or replacing police patrols.123 Widely adopted by London authorities
in the early- and mid-1990s, the CCTV system was hailed as the “Friendly Eye
in the Sky” to skeptical London residents, targeting only those who acted
suspiciously.124 Two high-profile events—the unsuccessful bombing
assassination attempt against then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and a
grainy CCTV recording of a London toddler being lured away by his 10-year-old
killers—fueled general anxiety in England over public disorder, and led to a
flood of government spending on the installation of CCTV systems throughout
England and Europe generally.125
Cities in the United States were slower to adopt CCTV, with only
sporadic deployment in the late 1990s, and then only using them “primarily to
monitor pedestrian traffic in downtown and residential districts.”126 A
combination of technological advances, dropping costs, and the events of 9/11
finally drove U.S. cities to adopt CCTV in a wide variety of public safety
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spheres.127 A renewed focus on public safety post-9/11 created an environment
where
almost all cities have become more frightening to their inhabitants,
albeit with the fear often out of proportion to the reality.
Increasing mobility of criminals means that no area is safe from
crime. Attempts are being made to shield areas and make them as
safe as possible, sometimes by cutting them off or controlling them
through closed circuit television systems.128
The growth of first generation CCTV systems was still hindered by the
fact that these cameras still required a human being to monitor, interpret, and
act on their data.129 This created a number of other potential problems, including
questions of access, voyeurism, and other potential CCTV abuses.130 A post-9/11
flurry of video- and image-processing research yielded a second generation of
CCTV systems, capable of automating the intelligence gathering process
through advanced analysis algorithms.131 Not only did these second generation
CCTV systems increase the amount of information that could be gleaned from
real-time video, but it also addressed some of the other concerns posed by
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human-in-the-loop monitoring.132 The deployment of advanced CCTV systems
gave police departments an inexpensive new source of information for collection
and processing as well as other, unrelated benefits, such as revenue generation,
making their ubiquitous adoption a foregone conclusion.133
Despite these advances, CCTV still had its limits. CCTV systems could
watch, unblinking, for unlimited amounts of time, but even the most advanced
systems could not replace the surveillance value of a police officer on the street.
Under the broken windows policing model, police departments found that a
great deal of useful information could be gathered from the subjects of nuisance
crime arrests.134 As police departments’ information systems demanded
additional data from its officers, however, new sources of that information had
to be found. In New York City and elsewhere, police departments began to
employ an expanded use of the Terry stop as part of their broken windows
toolkit.135 These stops, which came to be known as “stop and frisk” searches, fell
under a policy of “non-arrest approaches” to citizens, and blended well with an
increase in “gun-oriented policing” in multiple departments.136 The
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performance-measurement system employed by Compstat incentivized police
departments and officers to aggressively employ stop and frisk practices, and
effectively lowered the bar for such stops, allowing for an expansive definition of
an officer’s “reasonable suspicion.”137
Of course, once data generated by structural surveillance begins to arrive
in increasing amounts, police systems such as Compstat must find a way to
make sense of this information. There are two aspects to this process: dynamic
analysis, where information is collected, organized, analyzed, and the results
disseminated in real-time (or near-real-time), allowing for direct action and
deployment; and static analysis, which takes advantage of the fact that digital
data storage has become an effectively no-cost operation, and performs pattern
analysis retroactively to direct and adjust police deployment strategy.138 Neither
of these tasks are revolutionary by themselves, but the increased data flows and
information processing capabilities that have followed in the wake of broken
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windows policing strategies have made available to police departments unheard
of levels of analytical tools and have enabled the use of algorithmic policing.139
Generally speaking, algorithmic policing is nothing more than an
automated version of the approach described in Wilson’s and Kelling’s original
article.140 But instead on relying on human-centered processes of surveillance
and analysis, it uses information technology to integrate massive amounts of
intelligence data from multiple sources, including police reports, arrest records,
DNA and fingerprint data, CCTV, and license plate readers, and provide
automated, rapid situational analysis to police and other government agencies.141
Algorithmic policing is a relatively new addition to the broken windows policing
repertoire, aided in large part through the increasing numbers of “fusion”
operations between traditional law enforcement and national security and
terrorism agencies.142 The resulting blurring of lines between traditional policing
and national security concerns has led to skepticism over these new programs,
but such operations have continued to grow in the current post-9/11 public
safety environment.143
Here we see the transformation of broken windows policing and
associated programs into structural surveillance. By making the information
139
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processing system—known as Compstat in New York and emulated elsewhere—
the primary and direct consumer of surveillance data, police departments
effectively removed the watcher (object) from the surveillance equation. Police
officers were encouraged to gather intelligence information not for their own
immediate purposes, but to be fed into Compstat for analysis and
dissemination.144 This incentivized the individual police officer to act more like a
surveillance collection device and less as a professional, trained in crime
detection and prevention.145 Further, the Compstat system required ever
increasing amounts of information, which drove police departments to increase
patrols and nuisance crime arrests, a strategy that generated dramatic increases
in the sizes of police departments, an ironic result for a policy meant to make
more efficient use of static or shrinking numbers of available officers.146 When
the system required more information, departments turned to high-tech
solutions like CCTV as well as additional low-tech solutions, like stop-and-frisk
policies. And as the information flow became larger, departments implemented
increasingly sophisticated analysis systems, such as algorithmic policing, to
manage the increased bandwidth.
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Superficially, this approach appears valid because the underlying concerns
appear valid, but there is a problem with the theory’s asserted essentialism with
respect to the perception of disorder. Signals of social disorder are not
unambiguous, and there is no agreed-upon natural meaning of disorder.147 This
is not to say that there are not certain signals of social disorder, such as rotting
garbage, litter, discarded drug paraphernalia, graffiti, and abandoned cars, that
are posited by broken windows theorists as objective measures of disorder or
decay, but perceptions of disorder often carry with them an implicit bias, and
will directly affect who benefits from broken windows policing, and who bears
its burdens.148 Studies of the effects of broken windows policing and its
associated means of structural surveillance on poor and minority populations
over the past decade have generated a strong body of empirical evidence
showing that these populations bear a significantly disproportionate amount of
the burden of these systems.149 There are a number of reasons behind these
results, but chief among them is the implicit linking of social disorder with a
limited number of certain kinds of criminal behavior—the majority of which
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tended to exist only in minority or poor neighborhoods—along with a “zero
tolerance” approach to these selected behaviors.150
The result of this policy created a system of structural surveillance with
the notional goal of dynamically preventing crime and improving the quality of
life and access within a city, but with the ironic result of establishing permanent
or static means of surveillance in certain “bad” neighborhoods, containing rather
than eliminating disorder, and reinforcing the growth of private or semi-public
spaces which curtail the Olmstedian view of public access.151 These
contemporary policies are often justified using many of the same rationales
(albeit with carefully softened language) as those found in the 19th century
policies designed to control and subdue the “dangerous classes.”152 We thus find
ourselves with a growing system of structural surveillance, created in the name
of public safety, that certain portions of the populations see as necessary and/or
nearly invisible, while other portions of the population—those forced to live
under its perpetual gaze—are left to choose between grudging acceptance or
outright hostility, both of which result in negative individual and societal
effects.153
[Possibly address national security angle here]
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B.

Social Programs

The management of government services and public welfare programs is
as old as government itself.154 The crisis of control that arose with the rapid
population growth and urbanization of 18th and 19th century industrialization
inspired governments to seek methods to manage their burgeoning
underclasses.155 The pseudo-sciences of social Darwinism and eugenics gained
fast traction in Europe and the United States, bolstered in large part by the
widely shared opinion among the governing elites of those nations that the
“dangerous classes” were made up of physically, psychologically, and morally
inferior beings.156 This gave governments—and their increasingly efficient
bureaucracies—the moral cover they needed to begin the promulgation of social
engineering programs on a large scale, meant either to improve those few among
the lower classes who could possibly be redeemed through education and hard

154

One of the chief problems faced by early governments was the provision and
management of social services. Records from the ancient societies of
Mesopotamia, China, India, Egypt, Greece, Persia, and Rome identify multiple
methods—some more successful than others—to manage economic, financial,
and social aspects of public welfare. See, e.g., Salvador Carmona & Mahmoud
Ezzamel, Accounting and accountability in ancient civilizations: Mesopotamia and ancient
Egypt, 20 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 177–209 (2007). In 9th
century England, William I’s Domesday Book was an explicit attempt to record
the identities and assets of the entire kingdom, thus categorizing his subjects by
wealth (and worth). See Paul Henman & Greg Martson, The Social Division of
Welfare Surveillance, 37 Journal of Social Policy 187–205 (2008).
155
See Lydia Morris, Dangerous classes : the underclass and social citizenship
(London ; New York : Routledge) (1994) 10-16; John Gilliom, Overseers of the
Poor (University of Chicago Press) (2001) 24-25.
156
See id. at 23-26.
43

work, or in the alternative, somehow separate this “residuum” before it could
further corrupt the morally and physically superior “flower of the population.”157
Early efforts to ameliorate the problem of the underclass in an organized
way can be traced to the Poor Law Act of 1601, signed by England’s Queen
Elizabeth I to organize a structure to support local overseers to tax property for
the express purpose of aiding the poor.158 The effect of these laws was to clearly
separate local members from the community from outsiders so that local
parishes could satisfy the edict by aiding the poor within their community while
being legally—and morally—justified in denying relief to strangers.159 This legal
divide, along with a later set of laws that separated the “deserving” from the
“undeserving” poor, set a precedent that our social programs still contain, to
varying degrees, today.160 But this ability for governments to use the structural
components of social welfare to alienate based on gender, race, religion, or other
categorizations did not scale well beyond the parish until the control revolution

157

There were very few among 19th century elites who could muster any sort of
sympathy for the growing underclasses. The language found in discussions
regarding how to deal with the poor were most often less about providing
assistance, and more about ways to make the problem go away—often through
brutal means. One does not have to look far in the literature to find words such
as “worthless,” “indolent,” “filthy,” “dishonest,” “politically disruptive,”
“surplus” or “redundant” population, “degenerate,” “repugnant,” “animalistic,”
“savage,” “violent,” “mercilessly cruel,” “shameless,” “unfit,” “small, ill-formed,
disease-stricken, hard to kill,” and “hopeless.” See id. at 20-25.
158
See Joe Soss et al., Disciplining the poor: Neoliberal paternalism and the
persistent power of race (Chicago ; London : University of Chicago Press)
(2011) 85.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 85-87.
44

brought on by industrialization brought important advances in structural
surveillance techniques and technologies.
As societies and politics evolved throughout the 20th century, reform
movements drove early versions of what we would now recognize as modern
social welfare programs, while still retaining elements of the
deserving/undeserving distinction of earlier regimes.161 The United States,
taking a federalist approach based somewhat on the local, parish-based British
model, organized most of its social welfare structure at the state and local
level.162 Federal government agencies took a more active role during the Great
Depression and through the programs of the New Deal, but these efforts largely
became support mechanisms for state and local social service programs.163 And
apart from a brief moment of optimism in 1964 when the federal government
expressed its intent “not only to relieve the symptoms of poverty, but to cure it
and, above all, to prevent it,” the chief goal of government social welfare was, at
best, a means of managing the problem of poverty, and later, to act as a service
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conduit for the low end of capitalism, providing labor on the employer’s terms,
and freezing out those unable to satisfy these “work first” requirements.164
A key component of managing the poor—as opposed to managing
poverty—was the continuous monitoring of those applying for or receiving
welfare benefits.165 Notionally beneficial to the continued improvement of
government program efficiencies, these data were also quite useful in the
pursuit of social control and the conferment by government of individual
identity.166 Recipients—or “clients”—of these systems were required to become
open books for government inspection in exchange for services.167 This meant
that the government’s “friendly visitor,” acting as both counselor and
investigator/inspector, was to be given a free hand to complete the required
“searching examinations.”168 To support this goal, elaborate systems—both
technological and otherwise—of structural surveillance were implemented to
enforce work requirements, spot fraud, and often stigmatize, humiliate, and
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alienate social services recipients.169 The methods include “suitable home”
inspections, “man in the house” searches, means testing, labor testing, residency
checks, and random drug testing, all without a warrant, and all in the name of
social ordering and social control.170
Modern social welfare systems have taken an especially disciplinary turn
since the late 20th century, which has had an especially deleterious effect on
minority populations, especially African Americans.171 And while it is obvious
that large scale information collection and record keeping is a critical part of any
government social service program, current structural surveillance systems also
provide the means to stigmatize, scrutinize, and otherwise manage population
segments who are least able to resist such methods.172 This goes to the heart of
structural surveillance—a complex system of information collection and record
keeping that, over time, becomes a part of the background noise of society,
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visible only to those who administer it or who have the misfortune of being
under its gaze. As I will show in the following section, these systems can cause
significant damage to subsets of society, even when those systems are notionally
in place for the benefit of all.

IV.

The Effects of Structural Surveillance

As I described earlier in this Article, the self-reinforcement and ubiquity
of structural surveillance allows for its uneven application across population
segments, which often results in unequal effects across society.173 As we have
seen, these unequal effects are often borne by vulnerable, disenfranchised, or
stigmatized populations, which can lead to lasting—and very real—societal,
economic, and civic harms. This section is an attempt to characterize and
categorize these harms by examining the existing literature relevant to the
structural surveillance examples described above.174 It is not meant to be an
exhaustive cataloging of such effects. Rather, I intend it as a springboard for the
next phase of this research.

A.

Enforcement of Social Ordering

Among the chief (ab)uses of structural surveillance throughout history is
the practice of establishing and maintaining otherwise artificial social
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structures.175 The aggressive attention paid to the “dangerous classes” in
Victorian societies is not much abated in today’s environment, although the
supporting language has softened somewhat, and the uses of structural
surveillance more subtle.176 As discussed above, in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, modernist optimism toward social control through scientific methods
combined with existing fears of a growing underclass and contemporary
scholarship which regarded the poor and working classes as fundamentally
flawed, to create social control mechanisms oriented toward the preservation of
existing social ordering.177 Many of these policies were removed or changed
through the social reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, only to reappear, dressed in
slightly different clothing, in the 1980s.178
Gandy referred to the contemporary commercial version of this
mechanism the “panoptic sort,” which used consumer surveillance to sort
people based on their value to the marketplace, and suggested that this analysis
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could be applied to other social spheres.179 The technological advances of the late
20th century made social ordering through structural surveillance a particularly
serious problem, especially following the increased focus on public safety
following 9/11—the ordering could be economic, political, racial, or based on
any sort of slicing and dicing one could do with the growing amounts of
available data.180 The effects of this ordering can be very real, limiting economic
and spatial mobility, social and political opportunities, and civic engagement
much more effectively than the Victorian legacy methods, due to the speed and
mobility of these structural surveillance systems.181
Returning to my ongoing example of public space, one can see the effects
of social ordering by examining the regulation or closing of public spaces as it
relates to the homeless population. As I discussed earlier, the Olmstedian idea
of open access public spaces in cities began to slowly erode throughout the latter
half of the 20th century, as American city planners shifted from the (Olmstedian)
“planned” city to the “entrepreneurial” or “post-industrial” city.182 Open access
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public spaces were often redesignated “private” or “quasi-public,” and the
introduction of broken windows policing and associated methods led to
increased monitoring of these spaces and police (and private) patrolling of de
jure and de facto borders.183 Homeless people—defined loosely here as those
who do not have access to their own private space or home—are forced to live
their lives in public spaces.184 As these spaces disappear or become more tightly
regulated and patrolled by authorities, the options for the homeless population
dwindle.
The effects of social ordering can also be seen in the increased use of stop
and frisk and investigatory stops under broken windows policing and the war on
drugs.185 Both of these methods are widely used when a police officer develops a
“reasonable suspicion” about the person to be stopped, often supported by an
officer’s opinion that the person “looked out of place.”186 This often meant that
the subject of surveillance was either poor or a racial minority (or both)
183
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observed in a largely white or upper class community, a not-so-distant relative
of the illegal redlining policies that were once used to contain the poor and
minorities within certain neighborhoods outside of wealthier, whiter areas.187
The investigatory stop has avoided the racist stigma of redlining—at least in a
legal sense—due to the gradual institutionalization of the practice under broken
windows policing.188 The practice has since become a fixture of structural
surveillance, and is now considered routine practice among police
departments.189 The irony of these policies, often touted as means of “reclaiming
open spaces” for the safe enjoyment of all, can be found in the resulting
reclaiming of spaces for some to the exclusion of others.190
A recent example of this institutionalized practice can be found in
Arizona law S.B. 1070, which, under the veil of immigration control, required
local and state police officers to determine the immigration status of anyone
stopped, detained, or arrested when the officer.191 This requirement,
affectionately deemed the “show me your papers” provision, was upheld by the
Supreme Court as constitutional in 2012, with the proviso that officers must
first have has a “reasonable suspicion” that they are not in the United States
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legally.192 Like similar investigatory stops, the Arizona provision is likely to
incentivize police officers to base their surveillance inquiries on the ethnicity
and socioeconomic status of the subject.193
There is strong empirical evidence that these “out of place” stops are
more likely to happen to “out of place” minorities than “out of place” whites.194
The effect is to convey strongly to poor and minority populations that their place
in society is below white and upper class populations.195 Studies have shown
that the subjects of these stops are often made to feel like second-class citizens
whose lives are under the constant scrutiny and judgment of a capricious
state.196

192

Arizona v. United States.
Pulled Over.
194
See Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken windows: New evidence from New
York City and a five-city social experiment, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
271–320 (2006).
195
See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing
New York Style, 97 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 291 (1998); Reed Collins, Strolling
while poor: How broken-windows policing created a new crime in Baltimore, 14 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 419 (2007); Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken
windows: New evidence from New York City and a five-city social experiment, THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 271–320 (2006); Judith Greene, Zero
Tolerance: A Case Study of Police Policies and Practicies in New York City, 45 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 171–187 (1999); Andrew Gelman, Alex Kiss & Jeffrey Fagan, An
Analysis of the NYPD’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias,
COLUMBIA PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER (2006),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=846365 (last visited Apr
30, 2015).
196
See Reed Collins, Strolling while poor: How broken-windows policing created a new
crime in Baltimore, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 419 (2007); Pulled Over.
193

53

This effect is also clearly visible through government social relief policies,
especially since the wave of welfare reforms initiated in the 1980s under the
Reagan administration, and again in the 1990s under the Clinton
administration.197 These policies were written to be punitive to existing
recipients of public aid, and discouraging to potential applicants, through
practices such as means testing, stigmatization, warrantless searches, residency
requirements, and even through the enlistment of informants.198 Recipients of
welfare under these programs describe feeling as if they were in prison, as
powerless, and as not worthy of basic human dignity.199 They describe
themselves as defenseless subjects of a faceless an often-hostile bureaucracy,
stripped of basic privacy rights, and powerless to complain about any of this, as
it would likely incur the risk the loss of benefits.200
Another, more subtle, yet no less corrosive result of these policies is a
growing fear and mistrust of our fellow citizens. The modern idea of the public
sphere depends heavily on our ability to have “ubiquitous and uncontrolled
encounters of people and groups” in our shared areas without barriers—both
literal and figurative—erected to enforce an artificial social order.201
Hypervigilant concern for matters of ethnic identity and socioeconomic strata
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has, time and again, led to a fear for physical security that leads to a feedback
loop of ordering.202 Structural surveillance programs in the form of “crime
control” very often target racial minorities or the economic underclass largely for
the benefit of wealthier citizens. These programs and policies will pit citizen
against citizen, leading to fear-based discriminatory choices in education, social
services, corrections, and the availability of economic opportunities.203 Even—or
perhaps especially—within the quasi-public sphere of the workplace, the
deployment and use of structural surveillance creates an atmosphere of mistrust
that can prove ultimately counterproductive to the employer.204

B.

Fear and Mistrust of Institutions

One of the most dangerous effects of structural surveillance is its role in
the loss of trust in societal institutions. An extensive body of literature has been
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written over the past few decades on the topic of political trust, with a renewed
interest following the events of 9/11.205 Much of this work has concentrated on
macro-level studies of confidence in government at its uppermost levels, and the
overall effects this has on public support for government action and the
allocation of resources.206 For the purposes of this Article, however, I wish to
focus on the issue of trust in a wider set of institutions, including the police,
public health, and public assistance organizations, which ultimately affects
citizens’ general attitudes toward government in general. The societal dangers of
intense and prolonged cynicism and feelings of alienation are, I believe, best
examined from the bottom-up rather than the top-down, since grassroots
disaffection can be a slow burning flame, often ignored at the macro level until
things go horribly wrong.207
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A recent article by African-American journalist Nikole Hannah-Jones
describes an example these effects in detail.208 While celebrating the July 4
holiday with her friends and family on Long Island, Hannah-Jones and a few
others decided to take a walk on the beach. The pleasant evening was
interrupted by the sound of gunshots. The shooter quickly disappeared, and
Hannah-Jones quickly checked to see if anyone was hurt, and noted that the
high school intern who was staying with them at the time was on the phone
with the police. This shocked the four adults in the group, who were all
journalists with advanced degrees, and also happened to be black—none of them
had considered calling 911 due to the “very real possibility of inviting disrespect,
even physical harm.” The group “feared what could happen if police came
rushing into a group of people who, by virtue of our skin color, might be
mistaken for suspects.”
Hannah-Jones points out that her thoughts on this topic are not unique
within the African-American and Latino populations, for whom policing and
structural surveillance have been a means of social ordering and control. These
means have been well documented in the literature concerning the Jim Crow
South, and black experiences in Northern cities during the Great Migration.209
As Hannah-Jones’s experiences illustrate, however, the structural surveillance
mechanisms that remain can still serve these purposes. Not long after Hannah208
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Jones’s guest began her 911 call with the police that July 4, the conversation
turned accusatory and adversarial, with the officer asking her “Are you really
trying to be helpful, or are you involved in this?” Hannah-Jones describes the
frightening and humiliating effects of being under constant suspicion by a
system of structural surveillance that is viewed as benign and/or invisible by the
white population, and concludes that, while African-American communities
desire a healthy and respectful relationship with the police and the state, the
“countless slights and indignities” that stem from our system of structural
surveillance will “build until there’s an explosion.”
These effects are not limited to minority populations, of course. We see
these same outcomes whenever structural surveillance is deployed to suppress
or control marginalized populations.210 For example, Gilliom’s work on the
surveillance of the poor provides an excellent illustration of the consequences of
alienation.211 He describes a population of “frightened, often lonely, women and
children who live on the edge of hunger and homelessness and in fear of their
caseworkers and their neighbors,” who “live in a time when the poor are vilified
by local and national political leaders,” and are “stuck in a cycle of
powerlessness.”212 Due to the nature of the structural surveillance arrayed
against them, this population fears the institutions that govern their lives,
because of their learned helplessness within a system that will only make things
210
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worse if they raise questions.213 This state, often accompanied by a Foucauldian
“internalization of the gaze” of structural surveillance, is the natural
consequence of a system notionally instantiated to provide a benefit, but
oriented toward punishment and control.214

C.

Civic Disengagement and Other Chilling Effects

Fear or mistrust of institutions can often lead to the complete
disengagement from society by segments of the population. This behavior can be
viewed as an ongoing struggle between the desire by governments to assess,
analyze, audit, order, and discipline its citizens, and the resistance by those
segments of the population who are forced to bear the costs as subjects of these
structural surveillance programs. One of de Tocqueville’s principal observations
about the nascent United States was the centrality and importance of civic life,
attributing this important feature to citizen participation and cooperation as
“self interest rightly understood.”215 This concept was further observed in postWorld War II America as the population’s “belief that people are generally
cooperative, trustworthy, and helpful.”216 The ability for people to work with one
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another and with our institutions requires a base level of trust that can be easily
damaged under inequality enforced under structural surveillance regimes.217
Among the chief goals behind the implementation and administration of
structural surveillance regimes is the maintenance of social order, but this
power exercise has people on both sides of its equation. Those population
segments on the losing side can view themselves as shut out of the realms—
physical and otherwise—normally occupied by “respectable classes,” with the
obvious implications that go along with that reality.218 These experiences can be
physical, and even violent, as is the case with police interaction, or can be more
subtly oppressive, as with the case of demeaning questions from social or health
services case workers, but they all accumulate to erode the sense of trust in our
institutions and one another.219 The explicit goals of these structural surveillance
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systems and policies may not be intentionally discriminatory (although they
sometimes can be), their effect can nonetheless be to alienate certain population
segments from the mainstream.220 The results can manifest themselves in a
multitude of ways, from decreased political and civic participation, to chilling
speech, diminished educational opportunities, and limitations on access to
quality health care, just to name a few.221 Those most likely to feel these
deleterious effects are those segments of the population that are most
vulnerable to stigmatization—minorities (especially African Americans) and the
poor.222 The means of these effects are often invisible to those not targeted, and
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even when they are not, these structural surveillance programs become accepted
as a necessary part of society, and henceforth become ignorable by this
privileged group. This is, at its core, the reason we cannot allow the effects of
structural surveillance to be overshadowed by its more technologically
advanced—and more visible—cousins.

V.
Next Steps: Political Participation and Structural
Surveillance
Perhaps one of the most insidious and damaging forms of structural
surveillance in the history of the United States can be found in the racist
systems put in place following the abandonment of Reconstruction policies by
the federal government in 1877.223 Implemented across the southern United
States through a wide array of “Jim Crow” laws, this system was intended to roll
back the rights gained by African Americans following the end of the Civil War
and Reconstruction.224 Structural surveillance under Jim Crow was intended to
enforce a de facto system of racial segregation and discrimination, which often
flew in the face of federal law, but was largely ignored by an apathetic (or
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sympathetic) federal government.225 Central to the aims of Jim Crow was the
wholesale disenfranchisement of African Americans.226 Through an array of poll
taxes, literacy tests, character tests, and grandfather clauses, southern states
erected a maze of structural barriers for black voters and continued to do so
through 1965, when the Voting Rights Act was passed.227
Since that time, however, new, more subtle systems of structural
surveillance are being implemented in various “voter ID” programs.228 Like so
many systems before it, these new laws are presented both as fair reevaluations
of voter rights in a post-racial America, and as a necessary system to prevent
voter fraud.229 Time and again, however, it has been demonstrated that the true
intent of these programs is to disenfranchise minority populations through
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structural surveillance systems aimed at communities at risk.230 The next phase
of this research will focus entirely on these laws and their effects, taking into
account the nascent, but growing, body of research in this area, as well as
through new empirical studies and ethnographies.
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